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11 Introduction
International migration is a diverse phenomenon and its impact on source and des-
tination countries has attracted increased attention of policymakers, scientists and
international agencies. The migration pressure has increased over the last years and
is expected to intensify in the coming decades given the rising gap in wages and the
di⁄ering demographic futures in developed and developing countries. Understanding
and measuring the consequences for migrants, host countries￿residents and those left
behind is a major and di¢ cult task. In particular, the impact of the brain drain on
sending countries results from a complex combination of direct and feedback e⁄ects
which are extremely di¢ cult to quantify.
Due to the lack of harmonized data, the brain drain debate has, until recently,
remained essentially theoretical1. New data sets have been developed to assess the
magnitude of the brain drain. In particular, Docquier and Marfouk (2006)2 provided
estimates of emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment for 195 source
countries in 2000 and 174 countries in 1990. This data set gave rise to a couple
of extensions as well as to a number of empirical studies on the determinants and
consequences of the brain drain3.
One important extension which has been strongly disregarded in the literature
concerns the gender gap in international migration. In particular, little research has
addressed the issue of female migration while a considerable strand of literature has
focused attention on male migration. The share of women in international migration
increased over the last decades. According to the United Nations, this share increased
from 46.8 to 49.6 percent between 1960 and 2005. This evolution is mostly due to
the rising representation of women in the immigration stock of the most advanced
countries (from 48.9 to 52.2 percent)4. It results from many factors such as the rise in
women￿ s educational attainment, the increased demand for women￿ s labor in health
care sectors and other services, or cultural and social changes in the attitude towards
female migration in many source countries. Although family reunion programs ad-
mit many women in destination countries, women cannot be considered as passive
companion migrants. The feminization of international migration raises speci￿c eco-
nomic issues related to the gendered determinants and consequences of migration. In
particular, women￿ s brain drain is likely to a⁄ect sending countries in a very peculiar
way.
First of all, women￿ s level of schooling is a fundamental ingredient for growth.
Many studies demonstrate that women￿ s education complements children￿ s invest-
ments in school and has important e⁄ects on the human capital of future generations
1See Commander et al. (2004) or Docquier and Rapoport (2007) for literature surveys.
2Henceforth, DM06.
3See Docquier et al. (2007), Beine et al. (2007b), Cecchi et al. (2007), Krueger and Rapoport
(2006), Nimii and Ozden (2006), Javorcik et al. (2006), Grogger and Hanson (2007), Easterly and
Nyarko (2005), etc.
4In developing countries, the share of women has been relatively stable over time.
2(see World Bank, 2007). Better educated mothers are superior teachers in the home,
as demonstrated by Behrman et al. (1997) in the case of India. Hence, for a given
investment in children, more educated mothers produce children with higher levels
of human capital (Haveman and Wolfe 1995, Summers 1992). It can also be ar-
gued that schooled women contribute more income to the household, which may lead
to more investment in child schooling and lower fertility rates. Another argument
is that mothers with a high level of education have greater command of resources
within the household (higher bargaining power), which they choose to allocate to
children at higher levels than do men (see Quisumbing, 2003). Unsurprisingly, at the
aggregate level, many studies have emphasized the role of female education in raising
labor productivity and economic growth, suggesting that educational gender gaps are
an impediment to economic development. This is the result obtained in Knowles
et al. (2000) who use Barro and Lee￿ s human capital indicators, or Coulombe and
Tremblay (2006) who relied on the International Adult Literacy Survey to build an
homogenized indicator of human capital. These studies suggest that investment in
the human capital of women is crucial in countries where the gender gap in education
is high5. Societies that have a preference for not investing in girls or that lose a high
proportion of skilled women through emigration may experience slower growth and
reduced income.
Second, women￿ s brain drain is a crucial issue as women￿ s human capital is an
even scarcer resource than men￿ s human capital. At the world level, our estimates
based on Barro and Lee (2000) and own calculations reveal that the percentage of
women with post-secondary education rose from 7.3 to 9.8 percent between 1990
and 2000, while the male proportion rose from 10.9 to 12.5 percent. Similarly, the
percentage of women with completed secondary education rose from 31.6 to 34.7
percent during the same period while the male proportion rose from 45.4 to 46.8
percent. Although the gender gap decreases over time, women are still lagging far
behind men. In addition, the convergence movement is mainly perceptible in high-
income countries where recent generations of women are as well or more educated
than young men. In low-income countries, the gender gap is much greater (in 2000,
only 2.4 percent of women had post-secondary education, against 5.5 percent for men)
and the convergence is slow. Such a gender gap in education is ampli￿ed by the fact
that women have lower participation rates than men. As women still face unequal
access to tertiary education and skilled jobs in less developed countries, women￿ s
brain drain may generate higher relative losses than male brain drain.
Finally, as documented in Morrison, Schi⁄ and Sjoblom (2007), the feminization
of migration is likely to a⁄ect future amounts of remittances, the size of diaspora
externalities and the structure of activities in source countries. In this report, women
are shown to send remittances over longer time periods, to send larger amounts to
5In the same vein, Klasen (1999) or Dollar and Gatti (1999) demonstrated that gender inequality
acts as a signi￿cant constraint on growth in cross-country regressions, a result con￿rmed by Blackden
et al. (2006) in the case of sub-Saharn Africa.
3distant family members and have di⁄erent impacts on household expenditures at
origin. In a study on South Africa, Collinson (2003) shows that employed men remit
25 percent less than employed women. Regarding the determinants of migration, it
is also argued that women and men do not respond to push and pull factors with
the same intensity. Social networks are usually seen as more important for women
who rely more strongly on relatives and friends for help, information, protection and
guidance at destination. Without a gendered assessment of the brain drain, it is
obviously impossible to conduct a complete analysis of these issues.
In this paper, we build on the DM06 data set, update the data using new sources,
homogenize 1990 and 2000 concepts, and introduce the gender breakdown. We pro-
vide revised stocks and rates of emigration by level of schooling and gender. Our gross
data reveal that the share of women in the skilled immigrant population increased
in almost all OECD destination countries between 1990 and 2000. Consequently, for
the vast majority of source regions, the growth rates of skilled female emigrants were
always bigger than the growth rates obtained for unskilled women or skilled men.
The evolution was particularly in the least developed countries. This feminization
of the South-North brain drain mostly re￿ ects gendered changes in the supply of
education. We show that the cross-country correlation between emigration stocks of
women and men is extremely high (about 97 percent), with women￿ s numbers slightly
below men￿ s ones. However, these skilled female migrants are drawn from a much
smaller population. Hence, in relative terms, the correlation in rates (88 percent)
is much lower than in stocks. On average, women￿ s brain drain is 17 percent above
men￿ s. This gender gap in skilled emigration rate is strongly correlated with the gen-
der gap in educational attainment of the source population, re￿ ecting unequal access
to education. Although causality is hard to establish, it is very likely that equating
men and women￿ s educational attainment at origin would strongly reduce the gender
gap in skilled migration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
survey of existing data sets on the brain drain. Section 3 then describes our method-
ology and presents the measure of emigrant stock in 1990 and 2000. Section 4 analyzes
emigration rates. Section 5 summarizes the main results.
2 Background
The ￿rst serious e⁄ort to put together harmonized international data set on migra-
tion rates by education level was by Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999). They
used US 1990 Census data and other OECD statistics on international migration to
construct estimates of emigration rates at three education levels for 61 developing
countries (including 24 African countries). Adams (2003) used the same technique
to build estimates for 24 countries in 2000. Although Carrington and Detragiache￿ s
study initiated new debates on skilled migration, their estimates su⁄er from a number
of limitations. The two most important ones were: i) they transposed the education
4structure of the US immigration to the immigration to the other OECD countries
(transposition problem); ii) immigration to EU countries was estimated based on
OECD statistics reporting the number of immigrants for the major emigration coun-
tries only, which led to underestimate immigration from small countries (under re-
porting problem).
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) generalized this work and provided a comprehensive
data set on international skilled emigration to the OECD. The construction of the
database relies on three steps: i) collection of Census and register information on the
structure of immigration in all OECD countries (this solves the transposition and
under reporting problems noted for Carrington Detragiache); (ii) summing up over
source countries allows for evaluating the stock of immigrants from any given sending
country to the OECD area by education level, and iii) comparing the educational
structure of emigration to that of the population remaining at home, which allows
for computing emigration rates by educational attainment in 1990 and 2000.
The DM06 data relies on assumptions, some of which were relaxed in a couple of
extensions. Most of these extensions required additional assumptions but con￿rmed,
to a large extent, the reliability of using DM06 data in descriptive analysis and
empirical regressions.
￿ First, with only two points in time, DM06 does not give a precise picture of the
long-run trends in international migration. To remedy this problem, Defoort
(2006) computes skilled emigration stocks and rates from 1975 to 2000 (one ob-
servation every 5 years). She uses the same methodology as in DM06 but only
focuses on the six major destination countries (the USA, Canada, Australia,
Germany, the UK and France). Her study shows that, at the world level or at
the level of developing countries as a whole, the average skilled migration rate
has been extremely stable over the period. This suggests that the heterogeneity
in the brain drain is mostly driven by the cross-section dimension, thus rein-
forcing the value of the DM06 cross-country data set based on a much more
comprehensive set of destination countries.
￿ Second, counting all foreign born individuals as immigrants independently of
their age at arrival, DM06 does not account for whether education has been
acquired in the home or in the host country. Controlling for the country of
training can be important when dealing with speci￿c issues such as the ￿scal
cost of the brain drain. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006) use immigrants￿
age of entry as a proxy for where education has been acquired and propose
alternative measures of the brain drain by de￿ning skilled immigrants as those
who left their home country after age 22, 18 or 12. Data on age of entry are
collected in a dozen countries. For OECD countries where such data cannot
be obtained, Beine et al. estimate the age-of-entry structure using a gravity
model. They ￿nd that corrected skilled emigration rates are highly correlated
5to those reported in DM066.
￿ Third, general emigration rates may hide important occupational shortages
(e.g. among engineers, teachers, physicians, nurses, IT specialists, etc). In
poor countries shortages are particularly severe in the medical sector where
the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants is extremely low. Clemens and
Pettersson (2006), and Docquier and Bhargava (2006) provided data on the
medical brain drain. The elasticity of medical brain drain rates (as measured
by Docquier and Bhargava) to DM06 general rates amounts to 0.44 (R2 = 0:39).
Many observations are far from the overall trend. This suggests that the general
brain drain may not reveal important aspects of occupational heterogeneity.
In this literature, the gender dimension has been largely disregarded. An excep-
tion is a paper by Dumont, Martin and Spielvogel (2007) which relies on a similar
methodology than the one used here and analyzes emigration rates by gender and
educational level from about 75 countries. Compared to this study, we use a slightly
di⁄erent de￿nition of high-skill migration (including all post-secondary levels, even
those with one year of US college), and rely on plausible estimates of the structure
of the adult population in countries where human capital indicators are missing. We
repeat the exercise for 1990 and 2000, thus shedding light on the recent feminization
of the brain drain. We provide emigration stocks and rates for 195 countries in 1990
and 2000. Our data set can be used to capture the recent trend in women￿ s skilled
migration, as well as to analyze its causes and consequences for developing countries.
3 Emigration stocks by education level and gender
This section describes the methodology and data sources used to compute emigration
stocks by educational attainment and gender for each source country in 1990 and
2000. Subsequently, we discuss the main insights from the data.
3.1 Methodology and data sources
It is well documented that statistics provided by source countries do not provide a
realistic picture of emigration. When available, which is very rare, they are incom-
plete and imprecise. Whilst detailed immigration data are not easy to collect on an
homogeneous basis, information on emigration can only be captured by aggregating
consistent immigration data collected in receiving countries, where information about
the birth country, gender and education of natives and immigrants is available from
national population censuses and registers (or samples of them). More speci￿cally,
6Regressing corrected rates on uncorrected rates gives R2 of 0.9775, 0.9895 and 0.9966 for
J=22,18,12.
6the receiving country j￿ s census usually identi￿es individuals on the basis of age, gen-
der g, country of birth i, and skill level s. Our method consists in collecting (census or
registers) gender-disaggregated data from a large set of receiving countries, with the
highest level of detail on birth countries and three levels of educational attainment:
s = h for high-skilled, s = m for medium-skilled and s = l for low-skilled. Let M
i;j
t;g;s
denote the stock of adults 25+ born in j, of gender g, skill s, living in country j at
time t.
Table 1 describes our data sources. For countries where population registers
(mainly Scandinavian countries) are used, data is based on the whole population.
In countries where Census data are used, statistics are either based on the whole
population (Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, etc.) or on a sample of it (e.g. 25
percent in France, etc.). In some cases, we combine comprehensive register data on
the numbers of adult males and females, but use sample data to estimate the educa-
tional structure (the UK is estimated on 10 percent of the population; in Germany,
the microcensus is based on 1 percent of the population). The education structure is
sometimes given by region or groups of countries; we then assume a constant share
within the region. In a couple of countries, we use household and labor force surveys
to estimate the educational structure. Finally, we also use IPUMS International data
set for Mexico, Spain and the United States.
Aggregating these numbers over destination countries j gives the stock of em-





t;g;s. This is the method used in DM06,
without gender breakdown.
By focusing on census and register data, our methodology badly captures illegal
immigration for which systematic statistics by education level and country of birth
are not available7, except in the USA. Demographic evidence indicates most US illegal
residents are captured in the census. However, there is no accurate data about the
educational structure of these illegal migrants. Hence, we probably underestimate
the number of unskilled in the immigrant population, assuming that most illegal im-
migrants are uneducated. Nevertheless, this limitation should not signi￿cantly distort
our estimates of the migration rate of highly-skilled workers.
7Hatton and Williamson (2002) estimate that illegal immigrants residing in OECD countries
represent 10 to 15 percent of the total stock.
7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!
0￿1￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿2￿￿￿0￿1￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿2￿2￿￿￿0￿1￿￿.￿￿￿
&￿1￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*+&￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*+&￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!
￿￿3￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿3￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿%
*￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! *￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿! ￿*+&￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿3￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿
￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
2￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿*+&￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿*+&￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!"""￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿In this paper, we rely on the same principles as in DM06 and turn our attention
to the homogeneity and the comparability of the data. This induces a couple of
methodological choices:
￿ In what follows, the term "source country" usually designates independent
states. We distinguish 195 source countries: 191 UN member states, Holy
See, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Palestinian Territories. We aggregate
North and South Korea, West and East Germany and the Democratic Republic
and the Republic of Yemen. We consider the same set of source countries in
1990 and 2000, although some of them had no legal existence in 1990 (before
the secession of the Soviet block, former Yugoslavia, former Czechoslovakia and
the German and Yemen reuni￿cations) or became independent after January 1,
1990 (Eritrea, East-Timor, Namibia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau). In
these cases, the 1990 estimated stock is obtained by multiplying the 1990 value
for the pre-secession state by the 2000 country share in the stock of immigrants
(the share is gender- and skill-speci￿c).
￿ The set of receiving countries is restricted to OECD nations. We thus focus
on the structure of South-North and North-North migration. Generally speak-
ing, the skill level of immigrants in non-OECD countries is expected to be very
low, except in a few countries such as South Africa (1.3 million immigrants
in 2000), the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (9.6 million
immigrants in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman
and Qatar), some Eastern Asian countries (4 million immigrants in Hong-Kong
and Singapore only). According to their census and survey data, about 17.5
percent of adult immigrants are tertiary educated in these countries (17 percent
in Bahrain, 17.2 percent in Saudi Arabia, 14 percent in Kuwait, 18.7 percent
in South Africa). Considering that children constitute about 25 percent of the
immigration stock, we estimate the number of educated workers at 1.9 million
in these countries. The number of educated immigrants in the rest of the world
lies between 1 and 4 million (if the average proportion of educated immigrants
among adults lies between 2.5 and 10 percent). This implies that focusing on
OECD countries, we should capture a large fraction of the world-wide educated
migration (about 90 percent). Nevertheless, we are aware that by disregarding
non-OECD immigration countries, we probably underestimate the brain drain
for several developing countries (such as Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, Pak-
istan or Bangladesh in the neighborhood of the Gulf states, Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, etc.). Incorporating data collected from
selected non-OECD countries could re￿ne the data set. To allow comparisons
between 1990 and 2000, we consider the same 30 receiving countries in 1990
and 2000. Consequently, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Korea, Poland and Mexico
are considered as receiving countries in 1990 despite the fact that they were not
members of the OECD.
9￿ We only consider the adult population aged 25 and over. This excludes students
who temporarily emigrate to complete their education. In addition, as it will
appear in the next section, it will allow us to compare the numbers of migrants
with data on educational attainment in source countries. It is worth noticing
that we have no systematic information on the age of entry. It is therefore
impossible to distinguish between immigrants who were educated at the time of
their arrival and those who acquired education after they settled in the receiv-
ing country; for example, Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at
age 5 or 10 and graduated from US high-education institutions are counted as
highly-skilled immigrants. As mentionned above, Beine et al (2007a) provided
corrected measures by age of entry and found a very high correlation with the
uncorrected numbers.
￿ Migration is de￿ned on the basis of the country of birth rather than citizenship.
Whilst citizenship characterizes the foreign population, the "foreign-born" con-
cept better captures the decision to emigrate8. Usually, the number of foreign-
born is much higher than the number of foreign citizens (twice as large in
countries such as Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden)9. Another reason is
that the concept of country of birth is time invariant (contrary to citizenship
which changes with naturalization) and independent of the changes in policies
regarding naturalization10. The number of foreign-born can be obtained for a
large majority of OECD countries although in a limited number of cases the
national census only gives immigrants￿citizenship (Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Japan and Korea). It is worth noting that the concept of foreign born is not
fully homogeneous across OECD countries. In most receiving countries, foreign
born are individual born abroad with foreign citizenship at birth. In a couple of
countries, foreign born means ￿overseas-born￿ , i.e. an individual simply born
abroad.
￿ We distinguish three levels of education. Medium-skilled migrants are those
with upper-secondary education completed. Low-skilled migrants are those with
less than upper-secondary education, including those with lower-secondary and
primary education or those who did not go to school. High-skilled migrants
are those with post-secondary education11. This assumption is compatible with
Barro and Lee￿ s human capital indicators (based on the 1976-ISCED classi￿-
cation). Some migrants did not report their education level. As in DM06, we
8In some receiving countries such as Germany, immigrants￿children (i.e. the second generation)
usually keep their foreign citizenship.
9By contrast, in other OECD countries with a restricted access to nationality (such as Japan,
Korea, and Switzerland), the foreign population is important (about 20 percent in Switzerland).
10The OECD statistics report that 14.4 million foreign born individuals were naturalized between
1991 and 2000. Countries with a particularly high number of acquisitions of citizenship are the US
(5.6 million), Germany (2.2 million), Canada (1.6 million), and Australia and France (1.1 million).
11In the US case, this includes those with one year of college
10classify these unknowns as low-skilled migrants12. Educational categories are
built on the basis of country speci￿c information and are compatible with hu-
man capital indicators available for all sending countries. A mapping between
the country educational classi￿cation is sometimes required to harmonize the
data13.
3.2 Women￿ s share in OECD immigration
According to our estimates, the average share of women in the OECD immigrant
population decreased from 51.6 to 50.6 percent between 1990 and 2000. Country-
speci￿c shares range from 41.8 in Iceland to 59.8 in Poland . It amounts to 53 percent
in the United Kingdom, 52.3 in Canada, 51 in the United States, 49.5 in France and
46.2 in Germany. This share increased or stagnated in almost all countries over
the 1990s. The only signi￿cant decreases are observed in Belgium (-3.8 percentage
points) and Ireland (-2.8). Remarkable increases were observed in Austria (+11.3
percentage points), Portugal (+6.4) and, to a lower extent, in Turkey, Korea, Japan
and Switzerland.
The average share of women in the OECD skilled immigrant population increased
from 48.0 to 49.7 percent between 1990 and 2000. Country-speci￿c shares range
from 39.8 percent in Iceland to 56.4 in Poland. It amounts to 50.2 percent in the
United Kingdom, 49.9 in the United States, 48.4 in Canada (the only country where
there are more skilled women than skilled men), 46.6 in France and 45.2 in Germany.
This share increased in almost all countries except in Belgium (-2.1) and Spain (-
1.4). Remarkable increases in female share were observed in the Czech Rep (+18.6
percentage points), Finland (+9.2) and Turkey (+9.1).
12Country speci￿c data by occupation reveal that the occupational structure of those with un-
known education is very similar to the structure of low-skilled workers (and strongly di⁄erent from
that of high-skilled workers). See Debuisson et al. (2004) on Belgium data.
13For example, Australian data mix information about the highest degree and the number of years
of schooling.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































123.3 Stocks by education level and gender
Tables 2 and 3 give the emigration stocks for 1990 and 2000, respectively . We
distinguish total, low-skill and high-skill emigration stocks, the medium skilled can
be easily obtained by substraction. Although the data set reveals speci￿c information
by country, we only report here data by country group. We consider income groups
(following the World Bank classi￿cation), regional groups and groups of developing
countries as de￿ned in the UN classi￿cation, as well as a couple of groups of particular
interest (OECD members, large countries with population above 75 million, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and Northern Africa
and Islamic countries).
On the whole, we record 41.7 million immigrants aged 25+ and 58.2 million in
2000. The female share in adult OECD immigration was stable over the decade (50.6
percent in 1990 and 50.9 percent in 2000). These numbers are (for adults aged 25 and
over) in line with the UNDP global numbers reported for the OECD countries (50.2
and 50.6 for these two years). However, the women￿ s share varies across education
level. The share in unskilled migration is above 51 percent (it decreased from 51.5 to
51.1 percent during the decade). The share in skilled migration is below 50 percent
but strongly increased between 1990 and 2000 (from 46.7 to 49.3 percent).
The number of skilled women immigrants increased by 74 percent (from 5.8 to
about 10.1 million). The rise was important for developing countries (both middle
and low-income) where the number of skilled women emigrants was multiplied by 2.1
(+110 percent). Such an increase is in women skilled emigration is observed in every
source region and is mainly due to the fact that women￿ s rise in schooling level was
more rapid than men￿ s rise (supply e⁄ect). To a lesser extent, this also re￿ ects the
fact that skilled women are increasingly on the move. Indeed, as it will appear from
the next section, the female skilled adult population increased by 67.9 percent at the
world level and 83 percent in developing countries.
Figure 3 compares the average annual growth rates of women￿ s total and skilled
emigration stock and men￿ s skilled emigration stock by region over the decade. In
almost all regions the growth rate for skilled women is always bigger than for all
women or skilled men. The evolution was particularly strong for migrants from the
least developed countries, especially from low-income countries. The growth rate
observed for Central and Southern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America
are particularly high.
Table 4 reports countries sending the largest stocks of migrants to the OECD. In
absolute terms (number of educated emigrants), the largest countries are obviously
strongly a⁄ected by the brain drain. The elasticity of emigration stock to popula-
tion size amounts to 63.2 percent, revealing that small countries are relatively more
a⁄ected that large countries. The ￿ve largest diasporas (all education categories)
originate from Mexico (6.434 million), United Kingdom (2.990 million), Italy (2.337
million), Germany (2.299 million) and Turkey (1.942 million). Eight other countries
have diaspora above 1 million: India, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Portugal, Ko-
13rea, Poland and Morocco. In most of these countries, the women￿ s share varies from
48 to 52 percent. However, women￿ s share is particularly high for the Philippines
(62.2 percent), Germany (57.4), Korea and Poland (around 56 percent).
Focusing on skilled emigrants, the ranking unsurpisingly shows that rich countries
with highly educated population have better educated diasporas. The elasticity of
skilled emigration to population size at origin amounts to 65.7 percent. The largest
skilled diasporas originate from the United Kingdom (1.487 million), the Philippines
(1.111 million) and India (1.034 million). Germany and Mexico send more than 0.9
million skilled natives abroad. Four other countries have diasporas above 0.5 million:
China, Korea, Canada and Vietnam. In these top-countries, the share of women
among skilled migrants is large in Jamaica (62.1 percent), the Philippines (60.3) and
other countries such as Japan, Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Colombia.
Figure 3. Annual average growth rate of total/skilled stock of emigrants



































































































































































































































































































￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿￿￿￿ ’ $￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿￿￿￿ ’ $￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿￿￿￿ ’
&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿)￿* ￿￿+￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ *￿￿+’ ￿￿(￿( ￿,￿￿ ￿￿*￿- *￿￿*’ ￿￿*￿￿ +++, *,-- (+￿)’
&￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿!￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
#￿$￿!￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
%&$’￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ #￿$￿!￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿$￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (!￿!￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿$￿&￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿$￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿!￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿$￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (&+! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(&+! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ,$!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(!￿!￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  $!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
,$!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿!-￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*/0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿’$!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 1!￿!￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
#$￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 1!￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ %!￿2!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*￿$+￿!￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 0&￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
1!￿!￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 3￿￿￿￿$￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 $￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’$!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿*￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿+￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
4￿￿*!￿5!￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  $￿￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
/￿￿￿$￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!’￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿!’￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 3￿2￿6￿!￿!￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
7￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿0￿￿&+￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ %&$’￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿￿￿￿+￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ *￿&￿￿￿/8$￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
3￿￿￿￿$￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿$& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0&￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿!￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿4 Emigration rates
We count as migrants all adult (25 and over) foreign-born individuals living in an
OECD country. However, it is obvious that the pressure exerted by 1,036,000 Indian
skilled emigrants (4.3% of the educated total adult population) is less important than
the pressure exerted by 15,696 skilled emigrants from Grenada (84% of the educated
adult population). A more meaningful measure can then be obtained by comparing
the emigration stocks to the total number of people born in the source country and
belonging to the same gender and educational category. This method allows us to
evaluate the pressure imposed on the labor market in the source country.
4.1 Methodology and data sources
In the spirit of Carrington and Detragiache (1998), Adams (2003), Docquier and Mar-
fouk (2006) or Dumont and Lemaitre (2006), our second step consists in calculating
the brain drain as a proportion of the total educated population born in the source
country. Although our analysis is based on stocks (rather than ￿ ows), we will refer
to these proportions as emigration rates. Denoting N
j
t;g;s as the stock of individuals











t;g;h can be used as a proxy of the brain drain in the source country i.
This step requires using data on the size and the skill and gender structure of the
adult population in the source countries. Population data by age are provided by
the United Nations14. We focus on the population aged 25 and more. Data are miss-
ing for a couple of countries but can be estimated using the CIA world factbook15.
Population data are split across educational group using international human capi-
tal indicators. Several sources based on attainment and/or enrollment variables can
be found in the literature. As in Docquier and Marfouk (2006), human capital in-
dicators are taken from De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) for OECD countries
and from Barro and Lee (2001) for non-OECD countries. For countries where Barro
and Lee measures are missing, we predict the proportion of educated using Cohen-
Soto￿ s measures (see Cohen and Soto, 2007). In the remaining countries where both
Barro-Lee and Cohen-Soto data are missing (about 70 countries in 2000), we trans-
pose the skill sharing of the neighboring country with the closest enrolment rate in
secondary/tertiary education, the closest gender gap in enrollment rates and/or the
closed GDP per capita. This method gives good approximations of the brain drain
rate, broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence.
14See http://esa.un.org/unpp.
15See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
18Tables 5 and 6 give the structure of the adult population (25+) by country group
and region of origin.
The world adult population increased from 2.559 to 3.180 billion people between
1990 and 2000 (+24.3 percent). This global growth rate hides important changes
across education categories. While the unskilled population increased by 19.7 per-
cent, the skilled populaiton rose by 52.5 percent. Consequently, the proportion of
post-secondary educated workers in the world adult population increased from 9.1 to
11.1 percent over the period. Although women still face unequal access to education
in many countries, is worth noticing that women￿ s share in the skilled adult popu-
lation increased from 40.4 to 44.5 percent (their share in the unskilled population
remains above 55 percent). Our data reveal that gender gaps in human capital are
strongly linked to the level of economic development. The share of women in the
skilled population is still very low in low-income countries (30.3 percent) and in the
least developed countries (28.5 percent). The educational achievement of women is
particularly worrisome in Western Africa (13.3 percent) and Northern Africa (14.7
percent). Figure 4 compares the average annual growth rates of women￿ s total/skilled
and men￿ s skilled adult population by region over the decade.
Figure 4. Annual average growth rate of total/skilled adult population
(25+)



































































































































































































































































































￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿’￿￿ ( $￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿’￿￿ ( $￿￿￿ %￿￿ &￿’￿￿ (
&￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)*￿￿ ￿￿+￿,￿￿ ￿￿￿--)￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿*￿+)￿ +￿￿+-, ))￿￿￿￿ ￿+￿￿( ￿-￿￿￿￿ ￿-),￿￿ ￿-))* ,￿￿,(
&￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿ ￿.￿￿￿’￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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/+1￿￿￿￿￿344"""￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿"￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿It comes out that the highest growth rates were observed in the poorest regions of
Sub-Saharan Africa, Paci￿c Islands and Southern Asia. The level of schooling of the
adult population also increased signi￿cantly in Northern Africa. The change in the
intensity of the brain drain will then result from the comparison of the growth rate
of skilled emigrants with skilled residents/natives. In many African countries (except
in Southern and Northern Africa) and in Central America and Southern Asia, the
growth rate of the stock of skilled female emigrants exceeded the growth rate of the
skilled female population. The brain drain increases signi￿cantly in these regions.
The opposite movement was observed in Southern and Northern Africa, or in Paci￿c
Islands.
4.2 Emigration rates by education level and gender
Tables 7 and 8 show the emigration rates of unskilled and skilled workers, as well
as global emigration rates by country groups and region of origin in 1990 and 2000.
The reported index gives the female/male ratio in emigration rates by education level.
Our cross-country results are very similar to those described in Docquier and Marfouk
(2006). The correlation between the old and updated skilled emigration rates in 2000
is 94 percent. Skilled emigration rates are high in small and poor countries. Small
developing islands of the Caribbean (47.2 percent) and the Paci￿c (63.1 percent) are
particularly a⁄ected.
At the world level, women and men exhibit almost the same total emigration rates
(1.6 percent in 1990 and 1.8 in 2000). Women￿ s emigration rates are, however, lower
than men￿ s in the less developed countries, especially in Northern and Sub-Saharan
Africa. On the contrary, skilled emigration rates are more pronounced among women.
In 2000, the average (weighted) female/male ratio of brain drain amounted to 1.20.
Huge ratios were observed in regions where women have a poor access to education
such as Central Africa (2.225), Eastern Asia (2.030), Southern Africa (1.914) and
Western Africa (1.842).
Between 1990 and 2000, and despite the rise in women￿ s level of schooling, men￿ s
and women￿ s skilled emigration rates slightly increased. Although the gender ratio
of skilled migration rates decreased at the world level and in most regions, it rose in
some developing regions such as Central and Western Africa.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
,￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
-￿￿#￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿&￿’￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
3￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-,&$￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/0￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿.￿(#￿#￿#￿￿*+￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!*&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿,2*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/+1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿






￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿  %￿￿￿￿ &￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿  %￿￿￿￿ &￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿  %￿￿￿￿ &￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’￿￿￿￿ (￿￿) (￿￿) (￿￿) (￿￿(( (￿*) (￿+) (￿￿) ￿￿￿** ,￿+) ,￿￿) -￿￿) (￿￿￿￿
’￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
!￿#￿￿￿$￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
!#￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿$￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿#  ￿)￿ #￿￿￿$￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
*+￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿!!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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!*&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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/+1￿￿￿￿￿344"""￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿"￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿Table 9 depicts the situation of the 30 most a⁄ected countries in 2000 regarding
skilled migration rates. The right panel is based on the full sample. Small islands are
the most a⁄ected. The emigration rate exceeds 80 percent in nations such as Guyana,
Jamaica, St. Vincent, Grenada, Haiti, Cape Verde and Palau. Only three of these
top-30 countries have a population above 4 million. On the right panel, we eliminate
small countries and focus on countries with more than 4 million inhabitants. About
one-third of the most a⁄ected countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and 7 are
Central American or Caribbean countries. The brain drain exceed 30 percent in nine
countries, including ￿ve Sub-Saharan African ones.
Regarding gender disparities, Figure 5 and 6 compares stock and rates of skilled
migration by gender. Figure 5 shows that the correlation in stocks is extremely high
(97 percent). On average, the number of skilled female migrants is lower than the
number of skilled men. Figure 6 reveals that the correlation is lower in rates (88 per-
cent); women￿ s rate is on average 17 percent above men￿ s. However, the female/male
ratio in emigration rates varies strongly across countries. As shown on Table 10, it
ranges from 0.522 in Bhutan to 4.378 in Nigeria. Countries where women are dispro-
portionately a⁄ected are Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Angola and Guinea. On the other hand, men are over-represented
in Bhutan, Lesotho, Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Botswana. This gender
gap in skilled emigration rate is strongly correlated with the gender gap in educa-
tional attainment of residents. The gender gap in migration is especially strong in
countries where women have little access to education. A simple regression of the log
of the female/male ratio in skilled emigration rates on the log of the female/male
ratio in post-secondary educated adult population gives an elasticity of -50 percent
(R2 = :54) and an intercept which is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Hence,
equating men and women￿ s educational attainment would strongly reduce the gender
gap in skilled migration. It is also worth noticing that the correlation between the
gender gap in skilled migration and variables such as the UN gender empowerment
measure or the proportions of seats held by women in the parliament is almost equal
to zero.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿! "￿￿ #￿￿￿￿ $%" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿! "￿￿ #￿￿￿￿ $%"
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In this paper, we build on the DM06 data set, update the data using new sources, ho-
mogenize 1990 and 2000 concepts, and introduce the gender breakdown. We provide
revised stocks and rates of emigration by level of schooling and gender. We repeat
the exercise for 1990 and 2000, thus shedding light on the recent feminization of the
brain drain. We provide emigration stocks and rates for 195 countries in 1990 and
2000. Although our data set deserves some extensions (e.g. adding points in time
and accounting for migration to non OECD destination countries), it can be used to
capture the recent trend in women￿ s brain drain, as well as to analyze its causes and
consequences for developing countries.
Our gross data reveal that the share of women in the skilled immigrant population
increased in almost all OECD destination countries between 1990 and 2000. Conse-
quently, for the vast majority of source regions, the growth rates of skilled women
emigrants were always bigger than the growth rates obtained for unskilled women
or skilled men. This evolution particularly occurs in the least developed countries.
This feminization of the South-North brain drain mostly re￿ ects gendered changes
in the supply of education. The cross-country correlation between emigration stocks
of women and men is extremely high (about 97 percent), with women￿ s numbers
slightly below men￿ s ones. However, these women skilled migrants are drawn from
a much smaller population. Hence, in relative terms, the cross-country correlation
in rates (88 percent) is much lower than in stocks. On average, women￿ s brain drain
is 17 percent above men￿ s. This gender gap in skilled emigration rate is strongly
correlated with the gender gap in the educational attainment of adult populations,
re￿ ecting unequal access to education in many source countries. Equating men and
women￿ s educational attainment at origin would almost strongly reduce the gender
gap in skilled migration.
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